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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, digital facial content manipulation has become ubiq-
uitous and realistic with the unprecedented success of generative
adversarial networks (GANs) in image synthesis. Unfortunately,
face recognition (FR) systems suffer from severe security concerns
due to facial image manipulations. In this paper, we investigate and
introduce a new type of adversarial attack to evade FR systems by
manipulating facial content, called adversarial morphing attack
(a.k.a. Amora). In contrast to adversarial noise attack that perturbs
pixel intensity values by adding human-imperceptible noise, our
proposed adversarial morphing attack is a semantic attack that per-
turbs pixels spatially in a coherent manner. To tackle the black-box
attack problem, we have devised a simple yet effective joint dictio-
nary learning pipeline to obtain a proprietary optical flow field for
each attack. We have quantitatively and qualitatively demonstrated
the effectiveness of our adversarial morphing attack at various lev-
els of morphing intensity on two popular FR systems with smiling
facial expression manipulations. Both open-set and closed-set ex-
perimental results indicate that a novel black-box adversarial attack
based on local deformation is possible, which is vastly different
from additive noise based attacks. The findings of this work may
pave a new research direction towards a more thorough under-
standing and investigation of image-based adversarial attacks and
defenses.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→Multimedia information systems;
• Security and privacy→ Human and societal aspects of se-
curity and privacy; • Computing methodologies→ Computer
vision.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Human faces are important biometrics in identity recognition and
access control such as security check, mobile payment, and atten-
dance recording, etc. Thus, more and more face recognition systems
are widely applied in various fields for improving the service quali-
ties and securing crucial assets. In recent years, research has shown
that current FR systems are vulnerable to various attacks (e.g., pre-
sentation spoofing attack [35] and adversarial noise attack [7]),
which bring severe security concerns to the FR systems deployed
in security-sensitive applications such as mobile payment. In this
work, we investigate that the FR systems are also vulnerable to
another new type of adversarial attack, called adversarial morphing
attack, by perturbing pixels spatially in a coherent manner, instead
of perturbing pixels by adding imperceptible noise like adversarial
noise attack.
Fig. 1 presents three different types of attacks on the FR systems,
namely presentation spoofing attack, adversarial noise attack, and
our proposed adversarial morphing attack. Presentation spoofing
attack is a rather simple attack method by physically presenting
a printed paper, wearing eyeglass, etc. In contrast to presentation
spoofing attack without any pixels perturbation, adversarial noise
attack perturbs pixels in images by adding imperceptible noise. Our
proposed adversarial morphing attack is a non-additive approach
that perturbs pixels spatially in a coherent manner, while adversar-
ial noise attack adds imperceptible noise. Adversarial noise attack
is also called adversarial example attack and studies demonstrated
that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples
which are widely found in image [17], texts [15], audio [42], and
even malware [18], etc. Compared with physical spoofing attack,
pixels manipulated by adversarial attack can hardly be detected and
poses more severe security concerns than presentation spoofing
attack.
Next, we discuss the attack model and present some basic re-
quirements for black-box adversarial attacks. The ultimate goal of
the attack is to evade the model by triggering erroneous output and
reducing their performance in classification. The basic requirements
for adversarial attacks include:
(1) The attack should be performed in black-box manner. Most
of the time, attackers cannot gain any knowledge of the
model including architecture, parameters, and training data,
etc.
(2) The attack should be transferable. The crafted examples that
attack one target FR system successfully should have high
success rate on other FR systems.
(3) The attack should be controllable. Attackers can control the
perturbations in generating adversarial faces and query the
successful attack faces in limited times.
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(a) Presentation spoofing attacks
(b) Adversarial noise attack
(c) Adversarial morphing attack 
Figure 1: Three typical attacks on the FR systems. (a) presentation spoofing at-
tacks (e.g., print attack [13], disguise attack [35], mask attack [26], and replay
attack [8]), (b) adversarial noise attack [13, 17, 29], (c) proposed adversarial
morphing attack.
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Figure 2: Adversarial morphing attack with proprietary morphing field. The
change is very subtle, and x and x’ are indeed different.
(4) The crafted attack samples should look visually realistic and
semantically sound to humans. It would be better without
any obvious artifacts in the generated adversarial faces.
Our adversarial morphing attack satisfies all of the above four
requirements. We can effectively attack the FR systems without
obtaining any knowledge of the model in a total black-box scenario
and the learned attack pattern can be easily transferred to com-
promising other FR systems. When attacking the FR systems, the
adversarial faces are morphed by a learned proprietary morphing
field and look visually realistic to the original faces. Fig. 2 illus-
trates how to morph a face into an adversarial face with proprietary
morphing field to tackle the black-box attack problem. We can also
control the intensity of the morphing field to achieve a controllable
attack.
Specifically, we first collect numerous frontal and near-frontal
faces to attack the FR systems. The successful queries lead to per-
petrating faces and flow field pairs, which are used for learning the
universal morphing field bases. Then, for any given candidate face
during the attack, we assign a proprietary morphing field in each
individual attack and morph each and every single face accordingly.
The main contributions of our work are summarized as follows:
• In this paper, we introduce a novel type of black-box adversar-
ial attack, namely the black-box adversarial morphing attack
(a.k.a. Amora), that morphs facial images with learned propri-
etary morphing field to generate visually realistic faces that are
misclassified by widely adopted FR systems.
• We devise a simple yet effective method based on joint dictionary
learning to learn universal morphing field bases and proprietary
morphing fields for generating adversarial faces to evade the FR
systems.
• We have demonstrated the effectiveness of our adversarial mor-
phing attack on two popular FR systems (both closed-set and
open-set) with smiling facial expression manipulations without
obtaining any knowledge of the FR systems, additionally, our
learned proprietary morphing fields also outperform two com-
petitive baselines in morphing facial images to attack the FR
systems.
• Our research findings hint a new research direction towards
semantic-based adversarial attacks and defenses by transforming
images in a coherent and natural way, as opposed to adding
incoherent noises like adversarial noise attack.
2 RELATEDWORK
Adversarial Noise Attacks: The FR systems we will be dealing
with in this work are all deep learning based ones. It has been
demonstrated that, in spite of having achieved very high prediction
accuracy, deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks
[7].
White-box. White-box adversarial attacks require the full knowl-
edge of the deep neural networks. A lot of adversarial attack tech-
niques [11, 17, 30, 33] have been proposed. These techniques could
be applied to attack the face recognition system. Specifically, the
fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [16] generates the adversarial ex-
amples by performing one step gradient calculation, i.e., adding the
sign of gradient of the cost function to the input. Jacobian-based
saliency map attack (JSMA) [33] computes the Jacobian matrix
which identifies the impact of the input features on the final output,
i.e., which pixel has the most significant influence on the change of
the output. C&W attack [11] is then proposed to generate adversar-
ial attacks by solving the optimization problem whose basic idea
of the objective function is to minimize the perturbation such that
the output is changed. DeepFool [30] estimates the closest distance
between the input and the decision boundary. Based on this, the
minimal perturbation is calculated for adversarial examples.
Black-box. In a black-box attack setting, the attackers have no
way to access model’s parameters or structure and what they can
utilize are only input-output pairs. Current techniques which are ap-
plied to generate adversarial samples in a black-box setting mainly
rely on transferability, gradient estimation, and heuristic algorithms.
Papernot et al. [32] first exploited the transferability property of
adversarial samples to perform a black-box attack. They trained
a substitute model based on the input-output relationships of the
original model and crafted adversarial samples for the substituted
model in a white-box manner. Narodytska et al. [31] proposed a
local-search method to approximate the network gradients, which
was then used to select a small fraction of pixels to perturb. Chen
et al. [12] utilized the prediction score to estimate the gradients of
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target model. They applied zeroth-order optimization and stochas-
tic coordinate descent along with various tricks to decrease sample
complexity and improve its efficiency. Ilyas et al. [21] adopted nat-
ural evolutionary strategies to sample the model’s output based on
queries around the input and estimate gradient of the model on
the input. In addition, noise-based attacks (white/black) may not
be realistic, especially in face recognition domain. Differently, our
morphing based method can generate a more realistic face which
simulates diverse face transformations.
Adversarial Attacks on FR Systems: Sharif et al. [35] devel-
oped a method to generate attacks, which are realized through
printing a pair of eyeglass frames and fool the FR system. Differ-
ent from the noise-based approach, they adopt the optimization to
calculate the perturbation on some restricted pixels (on the glasses
frames) and they can be modified by a large amount. Similarly, Bose
et al. [9] also generate adversarial attacks by solving the optimiza-
tion constraints based on a generator network. These techniques
are white-box attack, which is unrealistic in real-world applications.
Additionally, some GAN-based attacking techniques have been pro-
posed. Song et al. [36] proposed a GAN, which adds a conditional
variational autoencoder and attention modules, for generating fake
faces [19, 37]. Deb et al. [13] proposed AdvFaces that learns to gen-
erate minimal perturbations in the salient facial regions via GAN.
Dong et al. [14] adopted an evolutionary optimization method for
generating adversarial samples which is a black-box method. The
performance is improved by modeling the local geometry of search
directions and reducing the search space. However, they still re-
quire many queries. So far there still lacks a work on black-box FR
system attack based on pixel morphing that is fully addressed in
this work.
Non-additive Adversarial Attacks: The non-additive adver-
sarial attacks have started to gain more attention in the research
community. The work of [40] and [6] are the two prior methods
that deal with white-box adversarial deformation attacks. In [40],
the authors use a second order solver (L-BFGS) to find the defor-
mation vector field, while in [6], a first-order method is formulated
to efficiently solve such an optimization. Our method, in contrast,
deals with a black-box setting where we cannot have access to the
classifier parameters. Therefore, we need to devise a new method
to facilitate such an non-additive adversarial attacks. Wasserstein
adversarial attack [39] is also a non-additive attack under the white-
box setting that is focused on norm-bounded perturbations based
on the Wasserstein distance. The attack covers standard image
manipulation such as scaling, rotation, translation, and distortion
while our method is able to obtain semantically consistent propri-
etary morphing field even under a black-box setting. The defense
against Wasserstein adversarial attack is also proposed [27]. In this
work, we use optical flow as a way to realize facial image morphing
and to carry out black-box attacks on the FR systems. It is worth
noting that the proposed attack is not on the optical flow estimation
step (see [34]), but rather on the face recognition classifier.
3 PROPOSED METHOD
Here, we first briefly review the adversarial noise attack and then
present an overview of our adversarial morphing attack. Next, we
detail how the proposed adversarial morphing attack method learns
the universal morphing field bases and obtains a proprietary mor-
phing field for each individual attack.
3.1 Brief Review of Adversarial Noise Attack
In the context of image (gray-scale, RGB, or higher-dimensional)
classification problems, let C be a classifier (shallow or deep) that
maps the input image x ∈ RN to a set of discrete and finite cat-
egories L = {1, 2, . . . ,L}. For simplicity, x is a vectorized single-
channel (gray-scale) image with N pixels in total. Adversarial noise
perturbation attack aims to find a noise or error vector e ∈ RN that
is small in ℓp -norm, i.e., imperceptible, such that when added to
the input image can cause erroneous classifier output:
C(x + e) , C(x) and ∥e∥p is small (1)
where ∥e∥p =
(∑N
i |ei |p
)1/p
for 1 ≤ p < ∞ and when p = ∞, ∥e∥p
is defined as ∥e∥∞ = maxi=1, ...,N |ei |. The search for e under white-
box attack is usually done by back-propagating classifier errors all
the way to the noise vector e. See Sec. 2 for a few popular algorithms.
Let x′ ∈ RN be a adversarial noise-perturbed counterpart of x, the
image modification procedure can be summarized as:
x′ = Perturb(x; e) = x + e (2)
Whereas, in this work, we are seeking a non-additive image modifi-
cation (spatial perturbation of pixels c.f. pixel value perturbation)
with the aid of optical flow:
x′ = Morph(x; fh , fv ) (3)
where fh ∈ RN and fv ∈ RN are the horizontal and vertical flow
field respectively, and the concatenated whole field is expressed as
f . The actualMorph(·) function works on 2D images, so there is an
implicit step to map the vectorized image and flow fields back to
2D. Modifying images according to Eq. (3) and causing classifier to
output erroneously is what we call the adversarial morphing attack.
3.2 Overview of Adversarial Morphing Attack
Under the black-box adversarial morphing attack settings, the at-
tackers do not have access to the model parameters (i.e., deep learn-
ing based classifier), and thus obtaining themorphing field unique to
each attack image by back-propagating the classifier errors through
the network parameters is not feasible. In order to obtain propri-
etary morphing field, we propose to learn a set of universal morph-
ing field bases, and through which, the proprietary morphing field
can be reconstructed for each individual attack image. In the next
two subsections, we will detail the learning procedure of the uni-
versal morphing field bases as well as how to assign a proprietary
morphing field.
Fig. 3 outlines the framework of our adversarial morphing attack
to learn universal morphing field bases and obtain a proprietary
morphing field for each individual attack image. It contains three
essential stages: (1) query stage, (2) learning stage, and (3) attacking
stage. In the query stage, we collect a set of seed faces and generate
morphed faces with GAN to attack the FR systems. Then, in the
learning stage, the successful attacks lead to the collection of perpe-
trating facial images as well as the morphing fields, and from which
we will learn the universal morphing field bases using joint dictio-
nary learning through principal components analysis (PCA) [38]
, ,
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Figure 3: Overview of the proposed black-box adversarial morphing attack.
by concatenating the perpetrating facial images and corresponding
perpetrating morphing fields in the learning framework. Finally, in
the attacking stage, we obtain a proprietary morphing field for an
input face to morph it adversarially for attacking the FR systems.
3.3 Learning Universal Morphing Field Bases
In preparing the training images to learn universal morphing field
bases, we first collect numerous frontal and near-frontal faces to
generate images with consecutive subtle facial expression change.
Specifically, we leverage the power of GAN in digital image ma-
nipulation to create a large amount of smiling facial images for
each seed face. These morphed smiling facial images are smiled in
a controllable way while ensuring other parts relatively unchanged.
The consecutive set of smiling faces allows us to accurately capture
the morphing field of smiling with optical flow which represents
the motion of the pixels between two images. Details are shown in
Section 4.
Once we have obtained a large number of (image, morphing field)
pairs: (xi , fi ) whose resulting morphed images x′i are successful in
attacking the model, we can capitalize on the fact that there exists a
correlation between the image xi and the ‘perpetrating’ morphing
field fi . There are many ways to learn the 1-to-1 mapping between a
given face and its morphing field. Ours draws inspiration from joint
dictionary learning for cross-domain generation/matching prob-
lems such as super-resolution [41](eq.24 therein), hallucinating full
face from periocular region [22](eq.4 therein), etc. In this work,
we use PCA, a simple yet effective method, to learn the universal
morphing field bases. By stacking the corresponding counterparts
as part of the same data point, we are implicitly enforcing a 1-to-1
Figure 4: Examples of proprietary morphing fields. The first row is the facial
images, the second row is the tight cropped faces’ corresponding proprietary
optical flow.
mapping between the two domains (i.e., image and morphing field).
Once such a mapping is established between xi s and fi s, we can
potentially reconstruct a proprietary ‘perpetrating’ morphing field
for any image of interest. The gist here is to ‘stack’ the two dictio-
naries (PCA basis for face and morph field) during the optimization
process so that they can be learned jointly. By doing so, the PCA
coefficient vector is ‘forced’ to be shared among the two dictio-
naries as a ‘bridge’ so that cross-domain reconstruction is made
possible. That said, if two sets of PCA bases are learned separately,
such projection would not make sense.
The training data matrix X ∈ R3N×M contains concatenated
mean-subtracted image and flow field pairs in its columns, with a
total ofM instances:
X =

Λx (x1 − µx ), . . . , Λx (xi − µx ), . . .
Λh (fh1 − µh ), . . . , Λh (fhi − µh ), . . .
Λv (fv1 − µv ), . . . , Λv (fvi − µv ), . . .
 (4)
where Λx ∈ RN×N , Λh ∈ RN×N , and Λv ∈ RN×N are diagonal
dimensionality weightingmatrices for the image, the two flow fields
respectively. By setting certain diagonal elements to 0 in Λx , Λh ,
and Λv , we can arbitrarily select the region of interest (ROI) in the
optimization. In this work, the ROI is tight crop on the face region
as shown in Fig. 2 to ignore image deformations outside the face
region that may contribute to the successful attacks. However, it
might be interesting to explore that in a future work. The bases
wi ∈ R3N can be obtained with the following optimization:
J (w) = argmax
∥w∥=1
w⊤XX⊤w = argmax
∥w∥=1
w⊤S1w
w⊤S2w
(5)
where S1 = XX⊤ is the covariance matrix with X being mean-
subtracted, and S2 = I. The objective function translates to a gen-
eralized Rayleigh quotient and the maximizer w can be found by
solving the eigen-decomposition of S−12 S1 which is eig(S1).
3.4 Assigning Proprietary Morphing Field
For simplicity, let us assume Λx = Λh = Λv = I. The learned
universal bases (principal components) can be broken down to an
image portion wx ∈ RN , as well as morphing fields portions wh ∈
RN andwv ∈ RN . When an potential attack image y ∈ RN comes
in, we can decompose it with the top-K , (K < N ) image portion
bases (Wx ∈ RN×K ) and obtain the PCA projection coefficient
vector α ∈ RK :
α = (W⊤xWx )−1W⊤x y (6)
By forcing consistent PCA representations during training for
both image and flow field, themapping between the two is implicitly
Amora: Black-box Adversarial Morphing Attack
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learned. Therefore, we can obtain the proprietary flow field fy ∈
R2N by reconstructing using the shared coefficientsα and the flow
field portionWf = [Wh ;Wv ] ∈ R2N×K of the bases: fy = Wf α .
Examples of proprietary morphing fields are shown in Fig. 4. The
first row is the originally given faces and the second row is their
proprietary morphing fields learned by our proposed approach.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the experimental results to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our proposed adversarial morphing attack in
evading closed-set and open-set FR systems. We quantitatively and
qualitatively evaluate our adversarial morphing attack on two popu-
lar FR systems under total black-box scenario. We also demonstrate
the transferability of our adversarial morphing attack by investi-
gating whether one adversarial face can be transferred to different
FR systems. Additionally, we build several baselines to evaluate
whether our learned proprietary morphing field could indeed be
effective in evading the FR systems under the ‘imperceptible’ as-
sumption.
4.1 Experimental Settings
Target FR systems.We study two popular FR systems, including
VGG-Face [2] with VGG16 and ResNet50 as their architecture. In
testing, facial images aremorphed by the learned proprietary optical
flow field. Then, different intensity level optical flows are calculated
to query the successful attack morphing fields. Finally, we use these
morphing fields to evaluate the transferability of our attack.
Dataset. We conduct experiments on the CelebFaces Attributes
(CelebA) [28] and CelebA-HQ [24] datasets. CelebA contains more
than 202,599 face images and 10,177 identities. In training FR sys-
tems VGG-Face (VGG16) and VGG-Face (ResNet50) to evaluate the
robustness of them in evading our generated morphing facial im-
ages, we select 2K and 1K identities from this dataset. CelebA-HQ
[3] is a high-quality version of the CelebA dataset with more than
30K facial images in 1024x1024 resolution. We use this high quality
facial images to generate smiling faces with the latest StyleGAN
[5, 25] to attack the FR systems.
Evaluation metrics. In attacking the FR systems, the morphed
facial images should be imperceptible to human eyes and is an
adversarial face to the FR systems which leads to misclassification.
Thus, some similarity measures between the morphed and the orig-
inal facial images are needed in order to evaluate the performance
of our attack. We will report the mean attack success rate as well
as the intensity of the morphing fields. Specifically, we employ the
Euclidean distance (ℓ2-norm) and ℓ∞-norm as metrics to measure
the intensity of the morphing fields.
Implementation details. Our numerous smiling faces are mor-
phed by StyleGAN and their optical flows are generated using
FlowNet2 [20]. StyleGAN utilizes the extended latent spaceW + for
editing images with a loss function that is a combination of VGG-16
perceptual loss and pixel-wise MSE loss [4, 5], which allows us to
generate smiling faces without any visible identity shifts [23] and
to capture subtle smiling variations with optical flows. FlowNet2
[1] estimates optical flow between two consecutive images in a
learning way. Here, we use FlowNet2 to generate optical flows
of facial images which attack the FR systems successfully. All the
Table 1: Identity and images of our collected dataset in the query stage.
Seed Face CelebA-HQ CelebA
Id 182 6,217 10,177
Img 18,200 30,000 202,599
Table 2: Identities and facial images for attacking and training the 2 popular
FR systems.
Attacking Training
Id Img Id Img
VGG16 120 1,141 2,000 42,256
ResNet50 120 1,159 1,000 21,152
experiments are performed on a server running Ubuntu 16.04 sys-
tem on an 18-core 2.30 GHz Xeon CPU with 200 GB RAM and an
NVIDIA Tesla M40 GPU with 24 GB memory.
4.2 Experimental Results
Here, we report the experimental results on the CelebA dataset.
Specifically, we mainly study the following research questions: 1)
the effectiveness of the learned proprietary morphing fields in at-
tacking the FR systems, 2) the relation between the attack success
rate and intensity of the morphing fields, 3) the transferabilities
of our adversarial morphing attack, 4) the capabilities in attack-
ing open-set face recognition systems and 5) the performance in
comparing with baselines.
Data preparation. In our experiment, we first collect 182 identi-
ties with frontal-face or near frontal-face from CelebA-HQ as seed
faces to generate morphed smiling faces with StyleGAN. Table 1
presents the number of identities and facial images in our training
dataset, CelebA-HQ and CelebA. In attacking the FR systems, we
randomly select 120 identities including more than 1, 000 facial im-
ages and morph them with proprietary morphing field to evaluate
the robustness of the FR systems against our adversarial morphing
attack. Table 2 presents a detailed number of identities and facial
images in attacking two popular FR systems. To obtain successfully
attacked perpetrating facial images and the pairing morphing fields,
we need to attack some FR systems in the query stage. Table 2
presents the number of identities and their corresponding facial
images in training the two popular FR systems (e.g., VGG-Face with
VGG16 and ResNet50).
Collecting successful attackmorphingfields. In the query stage,
we generate numerous morphed facial images to attack the FR sys-
tems to obtain perpetrating facial images and perpetrating mor-
phing field pairs for learning the universal morphing field bases.
Table 3 presents the detailed statistical data of the successful attack
pairs. More than 153 and 148 identities from 182 seed faces and
nearly 10, 000 facial images have successfully attacked the two pop-
ular FR systems. In order to obtain large numbers of facial image
and morphing field pairs to learn a representative universal mor-
phing field bases, we apply the following strategies to determine
a successful attack. 1) causing erroneous output, which directly
misclassifies the identity; 2) significant reducing the performance
, ,
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Table 3: Pair of facial image and morphing fields successfully attack FR sys-
tems in the query stage.
VGG16 ResNet50
Identity 153 148
Morphing Field 9,621 10,536
of FR systems, which has low confidence in predicting the identity,
i.e., the confidence score is lower than the set threshold γ = 0.6.
Metrics. Simultaneously, we use a series of metrics to explore the
relation between the attack success rate and the intensity of propri-
etary morphing field. Specifically, we employ two popular metrics
ℓ2-norm and ℓ∞-norm to measure the intensity of proprietary mor-
phing fields.
Adversarial morphing attack. In morphing facial images with
learned proprietary morphing fields, we need to identify the range
of the intensity of morphing fields and control them to investigate
the relation between attack success rate. We first obtain the range
of the intensity of morphing fields from the raw morphing fields
which have successfully attack the FR systems in the query stage.
The intensity of morphing fields are measured with ℓ2-norm and
ℓ∞-norm. To investigate the distribution of the intensity of rawmor-
phing fields, we find that most of the ℓ2-norm and ℓ∞-norm value
lie in a fixed range. Thus, the intensity of proprietary morphing
fields is split into several groups according to the fixed range value
to evaluate their effectiveness in attacking the target FR systems.
Assigning proprietary morphing fields. Table 4 and Table 5
consolidate the attack success rates vs. different intensity of pro-
prietary optical flow field with ℓ2-norm and ℓ∞-norm, respectively.
The intensity of proprietary morphing fields is mainly split into
three groups according to the distribution of the raw morphing
fields. In measuring the intensity of proprietary morphing fields
with ℓ2-norm, the three groups of intensity are as follows: 1) [2, 10]
with a step value 2; 2) [100, 200] with a step value 10; 3) [200, 600]
with a step value 100. In measuring the intensity of proprietary
morphing fields with ℓ∞-norm, the three groups of intensity are as
follows: 1) [0.1, 0.5] with a step value 0.1; 2) [1.0, 2.0] with a step
value 0.1; 3) [2.0, 6.0] with a step value 1.0.
Fig. 6 (L) and (C) plot the relation between the attack success
rate and the modulated flow field on ℓ2-norm and ℓ∞-norm. We
can find that the success attack is increasing with the intensity of
proprietary morphing field. Since the intensity range spans two
orders of magnitude, we present the plots in Fig. 6 (L) and (C)
in semi-log on the x-axis. Experimental results have shown that
VGG-Face with VGG16 as backend architecture is more vulnera-
ble than VGG-Face with ResNet50 as backend architecture. Our
Amora can reach and attack success rate at nearly 60% in attacking
the two popular FR systems, VGG-Face (VGG16) and VGG-Face
(ResNet50). Additionally, we also explore the relation between the
attack success rate and the modulated flow field on the multiplier
δ for enhancing the intensity of proprietary morphing fields. The
range of the coefficient δ is 0.2 to 2.0 with a step value 0.2.
Table 6 presents the results of attack success rate and the inten-
sity of proprietary morphing with multiplier δ . Fig. 6 (R) plots a
trend of the increase of the multiplier δ and attack success rate. We
can also find that VGG-Face with VGG16 as backend architecture
Figure 5: Morphed facial images (IDs from the left to right in CelebA
are 011141, 003668, and 011910, respectively.) with proprietary morphing
fields measured by ℓ2-norm (values are 10, 120, 140, 170, 190, 300, 600), ℓ∞-
norm (values are 0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 4.0, 6.0), and multiplier δ (values are
0.2, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 2.0), from top to bottom.
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Figure 6: The relation between the attack success rate and themodulated flow
field on ℓ2-norm, ℓ∞-norm, and multiplier δ .
is more vulnerable than VGG-Face with ResNet50 as backend archi-
tecture. To get an intuitive visualization of facial images morphed
with proprietary morphing fields, we present some morphed facial
images of three different identities on the three metrics in Fig. 5.
4.3 Evaluation of Transferabilities
In this section, we mainly discuss the transferabilities of our adver-
sarial morphing attack. Transferability is an important feature in
adversarial attack, which means a successful attack in one model
could be transferred to other models with high successful attack
rate. In our experiment, we demonstrated the effectiveness of our
adversarial morphing attack by investigating the attack transferabil-
ities between VGG-Face with VGG16 as backend architecture and
VGG-Face with ResNet50 as backend architecture. Our transferabil-
ity evaluation experiments are conducted on a dataset from Table
2. Each facial image is morphed with their proprietary morphing
field with ℓ2-norm and ℓ∞-norm as metrics to control the intensity
of morphing field. Table 7 presents us the experimental results in
evaluating the transferabilities of adversarial morphing attack. The
intensity of proprietary morphing field is measured by ℓ2-norm
and ℓ∞-norm and their value are presented in Table 4 and Table
5, respectively. Experimental results shown that our adversarial
morphing attack gives an average 90% success rate in attacking
transferabilities evaluation.
4.4 Open-set Evaluation
As open-set face recognition is common, we have evaluated the
effectiveness of our approach in attacking closed-set FR systems. In
this section, we present the experimental results of our adversarial
morphing attack in dealing with open-set attack where the focus
Amora: Black-box Adversarial Morphing Attack
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Table 4: Attack success rate with different intensity on proprietary morphing field measured by ℓ2-norm.
M\ℓ2 2 4 6 8 10 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 300 400 500 600
VGG16 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.61
ResNet50 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.37 0.50 0.60
Table 5: Attack success rate with different intensity on proprietary morphing field measured by ℓ∞-norm.
M\ℓ∞ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
VGG16 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.41 0.39 0.46 0.48 0.41 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.55 0.52 0.59 0.55
ResNet50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.23
Table 6: Enhancing the intensity of proprietary morphing fields on the mul-
tiplier δ .
M\δ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
VGG16 0.295 0.341 0.386 0.364 0.455 0.432 0.410 0.386 0.455 0.409
ResNet50 0.029 0.019 0.034 0.034 0.043 0.053 0.067 0.091 0.096 0.106
Table 7: The transferabilities of our proposed adversarial morphing attack
between VGG16 and ResNet50 with ℓ2-norm and ℓ∞-norm.
metrics\M VGG16 ResNet50
ℓ2-norm 0.935 0.926
ℓ∞-norm 0.893 0.885
is on unseen classes. We trained two popular FR systems with 500
identities on CelebA-HQ dataset, namely VGG-Face with VGG16
and ResNet50 as backend. In testing, the identity of a new given face
is unseen in training. In the experiment, we evaluate whether our
morphed facial images with assigned proprietary morphing fields
decrease the performance of open-set FR systems in classification.
We use the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve to evaluate
the performance of our Amora in attacking open-set FR systems.
ROC curve is an important and common method for evaluating
the performance of classifiers. Verification rate (VR) at 0.001 false
accept rate (FAR), equal error rate (EER), and area under the ROC
curve (AUC) are adopted as verification scores for evaluating the
performance of our adversarial morphing attack in attacking open-
set FR systems. Higher EER means higher attack success rate while
lower VR and AUC mean higher attack success rate.
Table 8 presents us the open-set face verification scores with
20 different intensities on proprietary morphing field measured
by ℓ2-norm on ResNet50 and VGG16 face recognition systems, re-
spectively. The two popular face recognition systems are more
easily attacked when the intensity of proprietary morphing fields
increased according to the face verification scores VR, EER, and
AUC. Fig. 7 shows the ROC curves for the open-set experiments on
the ResNet50 and VGG16 face recognition systems, respectively. In
Fig. 7, we select six different intensities on the proprietary morph-
ing field measured by ℓ2-norm to generate morphed facial images
for attacking ResNet50 and VGG16 face recognition systems. The
lower AUC means that the face recognition system is more easily
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Figure 7: ROC curves for the open-set experiments on the ResNet50 and
VGG16 FR systems.
attacked. In comparing with the original facial images, we find that
our morphed facial images on different intensity proprietary mor-
phing fields can achieve higher possibility in attacking open-set FR
systems.
4.5 Compared with Competitive Baselines
In this section, we build two competitive baselines, permutation
baseline and random baseline, to investigate whether our propri-
etary morphing fields can indeed be effectively served as guidance
in morphing facial images. In the experiments, we mainly 1) ex-
plore the attack success rate and the intensity of morphing fields
measured by ℓ2-norm and ℓ∞-norm, 2) investigate the attack suc-
cess rate and the visual quality of morphed facial images with
structural similarity index (SSIM) and normalized cosine similarity
(NCS). Here, we consider a region of operation (ROO) in evaluating
the performance of our proprietary morphing field compared with
baselines. ROO is the region where ‘adversarial attack’ assumption
holds, i.e., imperceptible to human eyes.
Permutation baseline permutes the proprietary morphing fields
while maintaining their intensity same as the original proprietary
morphing fields. As proprietary morphing field includes horizon-
tal channel fh and vertical channel fv , permutation baseline can
permute morphing fields within channels, named intra-channel per-
mutation baseline, and between two channels, named inter-channel
permutation baseline. Random baseline randomly generated mor-
phing field fh and fv , which follow a uniform distributionU[−2, 1]
as more than 94.4% raw morphing fields lying in this range in the
, ,
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Table 8: Open-set face verification scores (verification rate (VR) at 0.001 false accept rate (FAR), equal error rate (EER), and area under the ROC curves (AUC)) with
different intensity on proprietary morphing field measured by ℓ2-norm on ResNet50 and VGG16 FR systems, respectively.
FR ℓ2 2 4 6 8 10 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 300 400 500 600 Orig.
Re
sN
et
50 VR 93.37 93.33 93.31 93.28 93.26 92.88 92.82 92.53 92.61 92.44 92.28 92.13 91.50 91.44 91.32 90.43 85.19 79.01 71.73 64.49 93.38
EER 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.31 1.30 1.36 1.35 1.42 1.42 1.49 1.47 1.45 1.49 1.52 1.79 2.33 3.13 4.21 1.52
AUC 99.64 99.64 99.64 99.64 99.64 99.63 99.63 99.64 99.63 99.63 99.62 99.62 99.62 99.62 99.61 99.61 99.58 99.50 99.36 99.18 99.64
VG
G1
6 VR 94.33 94.34 94.40 94.38 94.36 94.71 94.74 94.76 94.80 94.78 94.83 94.80 94.73 94.73 94.64 94.66 93.71 91.83 87.52 82.66 94.69
EER 1.48 1.46 1.47 1.44 1.44 1.48 1.49 1.55 1.54 1.54 1.58 1.59 1.60 1.59 1.63 1.66 1.70 1.80 2.13 2.73 1.42
AUC 99.64 99.64 99.64 99.64 99.65 99.68 99.68 99.69 99.69 99.69 99.69 99.69 99.69 99.69 99.69 99.69 99.71 99.70 99.66 99.56 99.62
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 	
   	 
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1








  
! "	
! 	 
ROO Divider
Baseline: intra-channel
Baseline: inter-channel
Baseline: U[-2, 1]
Amora: VGG-16
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 	
   	 
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1








 
  !	
  	 
ROO Divider
Baseline: intra-channel
Baseline: inter-channel
Baseline: U[-2, 1]
Amora: VGG-16
Figure 8: Baseline experiment results on ℓ2-norm and ℓ∞-norm in attacking
VGG16 FR system. Baseline: intra-channel and inter-channel are permutation
baseline, Baseline: U[-2,1] is random baseline. Left side of the ROO Divider is
the region of operation where adversarial assumption holds. Amora trumps
in the ROO.
query stage. Fig. 8 presents us the experimental results of our pro-
prietary morphing field and two baselines in attacking the VGG16
FR system.
Experimental results in Fig. 8 demonstrate that our proprietary
morphing field performs better than the permutation and random
baseline in ROO (see the ROO divider in Fig. 8). Being able to out-
perform the baselines within the region of operation is what it
truly matters. Fig. 8 also illustrates that the two chosen baselines
also show its power in attacking FR systems. However, the two
chosen baselines are considered strong baselines as they capitalize
on the prior knowledge of what optical flow fields should be. It is
interesting to explore some moderate baselines in our future work.
Table 9 presents the experimental result in comparing with base-
lines where the similarity distance between original facial image
and morphed facial images is measured with SSIM and NCS. It
indicates that our proprietary morphing fields achieve a high attack
success rate when the morphed facial images are similar to original
facial images, especially the SSIM and NCS value are larger than
0.9 and 0.998, respectively. Thus, our proprietary morphing field
outperforms the three random baseline when the morphed facial
images appear subtle change.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have introduced and investigated a new type
of black-box adversarial attack to evade deep-learning based FR
systems by morphing facial images with learned optical flows. The
Table 9: Attack success rate and the visual quality of morphed facial im-
ages measured with SSIM and NCS with three random baselines, U[−2, 1],
U[−1, 1], and N(0, 1). Large SSIM and NCS values denote that the morphed
facial image is similar to the original face. Green region is the ROO.
M\ssim [0.75, 0.8) [0.8, 0.85) [0.85, 0.9) [0.9, 0.95) [0.95, 1.0]
VGG-16 0 0 0.048 0.073 0.373
U[-2,1] 0.278 0.128 0.079 0.032 0.046
U[-1,1] 0.346 0.181 0.104 0.073 0.035
N(0,1) 0.224 0.123 0.07 0.016 0.032
M\ncs [0.990, 0.992) [0.992, 0.994) [0.994, 0.996) [0.996, 0.998) [0.998, 1.0]
VGG-16 0 0.001 0.014 0.058 0.420
U[-2,1] 0.032 0.091 0.185 0.355 0.222
U[-1,1] 0 0.006 0.046 0.279 0.444
N(0,1) 0.008 0.052 0.151 0.366 0.312
proposed attack morphs/deforms pixels spatially as opposed to
adversarial noise attack that perturbs the pixel intensities. With a
simple yet effective joint dictionary learning pipeline, we are able
to obtain a proprietary morphing field for each individual attack.
Experimental results have shown that some popular FR systems
can be evaded with high probability and the performance of these
systems is significantly decreased with our attacks. Our observation
has raised an essential security issue in currently deployed FR
systems. Through comprehensive experiments and validations, we
have shown that a black-box adversarial morphing attack is not
only possible, but also compromises the FR systems significantly.
The proposed black-box adversarial morphing attack points to an
orthogonal direction that can complement the existing adversarial
noise attacks. Therefore, it is possible to combine various attack
types in the future. Also, while presentation spoofing attacks are
relatively easier to defend because they rely heavily on physical
props, and adversarial noise attacks are less likely to be presented in
real-world setups, it is useful to study the physical attacks based on
adversarial morphing, since it is a semantically coherent attack with
local facial deformation and is likely to happen in real scenarios
such as an expression filter to attack mobile face authentication
application (mobile payment/ social media), or in tandem with
freeform optics that bends light [10], etc.
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Figure 9: Original facial image ( ID in CelebA is 011910 ) and morphed facial images with proprietary morphing field measured by ℓ2-norm. The first image is
the original facial image and the next 20 images are morphed with proprietary morphing fields while images in black background are difference images of
original facial image and morphed facial image. The ℓ2-norm values are {2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 170, 180, 190, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600}.
Figure 10: Original facial image ( ID in CelebA is 011910 ) and morphed facial images with proprietary morphing field measured by ℓ∞-norm. The first image
is the original facial image and the next 20 images are morphed with proprietary morphing fields while images in black background are difference images of
original facial image and morphed facial image. The ℓ∞-norm values are {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 6.0}.
A MORPHED FACIAL IMAGES WITH
PROPRIETARY MORPHING FIELD
In this section, we present some high-resolution visualization of
morphed facial images with learned proprietary morphing fields on
ℓ2-norm, ℓ∞-norm and multiplier δ . The identity 011910 in CelebA
is selected for showing all the morphed facial images under different
intensity in our experiments. Fig. 9, Fig. 10, and Fig. 11 show the
morphed facial images on ℓ2-norm, ℓ∞-norm, and multiplier δ ,
respectively.
A.1 Discussion
The three figures above present morphed facial images with pro-
prietary morphing field on three different metrics with various
intensities. We observed that the morphed facial images in these
figures only exhibit minuscule artifacts that are imperceptible to
human eyes. This is an important trait for any kosher adversarial
attack, i.e. being imperceptible and stealthy. Our adversarial mor-
phing attack generates more visually realistic and natural faces by
perturbing pixels spatially in a coherent manner, which can poten-
tially be applied to producing ‘deepfake’ videos to fool detectors
with natural expression changed rather than perturbing pixels with
additive noises.
B MORPHED FACIAL IMAGES WITH TWO
BASELINES
In comparing the performance of our proprietary morphing field
and two competitive baselines, we consider ROO where ‘adversar-
ial attack’ assumption holds. To get an intuitive visualization of
facial images morphed with our build two baselines, we present
the morphed facial images with baselines in Fig. 12 on ℓ2-norm and
ℓ∞-norm. The two baselines are permutation baseline (including
intra-channel permutation baseline and inter-channel permutation
baseline) and random baseline.
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Figure 11: Original facial image ( ID in CelebA is 011910 ) and morphed facial images with proprietary morphing field enhanced by multiplier δ . The first
image is the original facial image and the next 10 images are morphed with proprietary morphing fields while the second row is difference images of original
facial image and morphed facial image. The δ values are {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0}.
Figure 12: Samples of morphed facial images with two competitive baselines. The first three rows represent the morphing fields measured by ℓ2-norm (values
are 180, 190, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600 from the left to right) and the morphed facial images are morphed with intra-channel permutation baseline, inter-channel
permutation baseline, and random baseline. The last three rows represent the morphing fields measured by ℓ∞-norm (values are 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0
from the left to right) and the morphed facial images are morphed with intra-channel permutation baseline, inter-channel permutation baseline, and random
baseline. Morphed facial images with red frame denote the image has obvious artifacts.
B.1 Discussion
The two baselines leverage prior knowledge of what optical flow
fields should be and illustrate its capabilities in attacking two popu-
lar FR systems. In Figure 12, we can easily observe that the morphed
facial images with two baselines show obvious artifacts when out-
side of the ROO. Our learned proprietary morphing fields produces
perceptually realistic faces and show promising results than the two
baselines within the ROO. Furthermore, the proprietary morphing
field can be served as a guidance in adversarially morphing the
facial images.
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